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THE PROPER BALANCE: EXCLUSION OF
EVIDENCE OR EXPULSION OF POLICE
OFFICERS
HONORABLE JOHN F. KEENAN*
I propose to start off with two quotes. My first quote is "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."' That is, of course, the Fourth Amendment, which is our
kickoff point for all this.
The second quote that I have is a quote from a great distin-
guished former Supreme Court Justice who, before going on the
Court, was president of the American Bar Association. So, he
was, in a sense, the leading lawyer in the United States, and the
quote is from Justice Powell in Robbins v. California.2 "[Tihe
law of search and seizure ... is intolerably confusing."3
Now starting with the first quote and going to the second
quote, let me give you some views that I have that are probably
controversial, and that I expect 99% of the audience will imme-
diately disagree with and wish to send me back quickly to Foley
Square.
Today the exclusionary rule is so much a part of our legal
landscape that it's very hard to believe that it wasn't applied to
the states before 1961.' Not until 172 years after the adoption of
the Fourth Amendment did the United States Supreme Court
first impose it on the states.5 Supporters of the exclusionary rule
find it very hard to point to a single statement from the time of
" Senior United States District Judge, United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York.
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
'Id. at 430.
4 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
r See id.
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the founding fathers through Reconstruction supporting the ex-
clusion of evidence at a criminal trial because of the Fourth
Amendment. That is not to say that the Constitution should be
violated. When police officers violate the law, there must be a
meaningful sanction or meaningful sanctions. A balance has to
be maintained between being fair and being effective, because all
of these things are delicately balanced. That's what the whole
society is about-balance.
The exclusionary rule as binding on the states resulted, as
you all know, from the 1961 case of Mapp v. Ohio.6 Lots of peo-
ple don't remember what the facts of Mapp were. Let me just
briefly summarize them. Ms. Mapp was living on the second
floor of a two-family brick house in Cleveland, Ohio,7 and she
rented out some rooms to boarders in the house. On May 23,
1957, three police officers came to her home and demanded en-
trance.' They explained that they were searching for someone in
connection with a recent bombing.9 Ms. Mapp called her lawyer
and after talking to him told the officers she wouldn't let them in
without a search warrant." The officers left.
Three hours later the same three officers, in addition to oth-
ers, returned and forced their way into Ms. Mapp's house.11 She
followed behind them demanding to see their search warrant. 2
Finally, one of the cops produced a piece of paper that Ms. Mapp
grabbed and shoved down the front of her blouse. 3 A struggle
ensued, and one of the police officers tried to retrieve the piece of
paper.14 He handcuffed Ms. Mapp, and the officers went about
their search.15 The bombing suspect wasn't found. No bombs
were found, and the piece of paper turned out not to be a search
warrant.
16
However, the officers did find four books, 7 which were alleg-
6 Id.
7 See id. at 644.
See id.
See id.
'0 See id.
" See id.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 See id. at 644-45.
16 See id. at 645.
17 See id.
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edly obscene.18 Along with the books there was a hand drawn
picture which was later described as being " 'of a very obscene
nature.' ""s Because of these books and the picture, Ms. Mapp
was convicted of possession of obscene materials." The appellate
courts in Ohio affirmed.2' She appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case
because the case obviously raised many questions.22
Among the issues urged before the Supreme Court were the
constitutionality of the charge to the jury, the sentence, the stat-
ute upon which the conviction was based, and the issue of police
misconduct. The Supreme Court, as we know, ultimately de-
cided that the Fourth Amendment applied to the states.' How-
ever, the Fourth Amendment issue, addressing the legality of the
police officers' search, was not really discussed by the judges at
all in the lower courts in Ohio. The only party to brief the issue
wasn't a party. It was an amicus, the American Civil Liberties
Union, that briefed the Fourth Amendment issue in Mapp v.
Ohio. Prior to Mapp, the Supreme Court had never said that
evidence obtained illegally in a state prosecution had to be ex-
cluded altogether.
Mr. Justice Clark wrote the Court's opinion, and although
the majority agreed that Mapp's conviction should be reversed,
only four of the Justices agreed to reverse solely on Fourth
Amendment grounds. Justice Stewart concurred upon First
Amendment grounds, 25 and Justice Black on both Fourth and
Fifth Amendment grounds,26 and the three other Justices argued
that the Fourth Amendment issue was not even properly before
the court.27 The end result was that a First Amendment contro-
versy having to do with the right to keep pornography in a resi-
18 See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, De-
velopment and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1983).
19 Id. (quoting Appellee's Motion to Dismiss or Affirm at 4-5, Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (No. 236).
20 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643-45.
21 See id. at 645; Ohio v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 388, 391 (Ohio 1960), rev'd
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
2 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 645-46.
See id. at 654-55.
24 See id. at 643.
See id. at 672 (Stewart, J., concurring).
26 See id. at 661-63 (Black, J., concurring).
27 See id. at 672-75 (Harlan, J., Frankfurter, J., Whittaker, J., dissenting).
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dence was transformed into the most important search and sei-
zure decision in American history.
My observations about Mapp were shared in great measure
by the late New York State Supreme Court Justice Harold
Rothwax who has written on this subject extensively.'
Now, obviously, all that doesn't have a lot to do directly with
Terry v. Ohio, 9 but without Mapp there never would have been a
Terry. Now, you in the audience have heard more about Terry,
yesterday and today, from true experts on the subject, unlike
myself, than you will hear for years to come. So, I'm going to
continue to move a little bit away from Terry to what to me is a
more fundamental consideration. Who was one of the most civil
liberty minded Justices of this century, and what did he write in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire?" I'm talking about Justice Hugo
Black. "The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Amendment says nothing about con-
sequences. It certainly nowhere provides for the exclusion of
evidence as the remedy for violation."31
I submit that Justice Black may have been correct. The
Fourth Amendment does not state that illegally obtained evi-
dence must be excluded. We've come to that point entirely on
our own. Most of you are New Yorkers-even those of you now
from Ohio and Miami. Who was the most renowned New York
jurist of the 20th century? Benjamin Cardozo. What did Judge
Weinstein tell you that Cardozo wrote? He told you this morning
that in the People v. Defore,32 way back in 1926, in refusing to
apply the exclusionary rule, Cardozo wrote, "[tlhe criminal is to
go free because the constable has blundered... 3 and that was
his view of the exclusionary rule.
Now, the sanctions mandated by the exclusionary rule are,
in a major sense, being imposed against society. The suppressed
gun, the suppressed counterfeit money, the suppressed narcotics,
28 See JUDGE HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996). Judge Rothwax has also discussed this topic in several of
his reported decisions. See, e.g., People v. Winograd, 480 N.Y.S.2d 419 (Sup. Ct.
1984); People v. Tomao, 467 N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1983); People v. Campbell, 451
N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. 1982); People v. Edelstein, 415 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).30 403 U.S. 443, 498 (1971) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31 Id. at 496.
32 150 N.E.2d 585 (N.Y. 1926).
Id. at 587.
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they do not have any negative impact on the police official who
was found to have violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. Former Police Commissioner McGuire, who I know spoke
here this morning, and who is to me a premier public servant,
did not break detectives back to uniform or even reduce first
grade detectives to second grade because the evidence they
seized was suppressed. What I wonder is whether the Fourth
Amendment and society might not be better served if the sanc-
tions were imposed upon the individual law enforcement officer
who violated the defendant's rights rather than upon the com-
munity by the suppression of the evidence.
If the police are misbehaving to the degree suggested by
those who have been speaking since I have been here today, why
could not a system be devised whereby, depending upon the seri-
ousness of the constitutional violation by the police, the individ-
ual officer could be penalized? The penalty could range all the
way from dismissal from the force, the most extreme, through
fines, down to loss of vacation time, or merely a reprimand for
the less serious violations. If we have been able to create a sen-
tencing grid of fourty-three levels with six criminal history cate-
gories for the scores and scores of criminal violations in the
United States Code,34 I don't see why we could not grade the de-
gree of the violation by the law enforcement official. This pun-
ishment to be imposed by the trial judge would result in the
admission of the evidence and the punishment of the two guilty
parties: The criminal defendant and the offending policeman. I
recognize, obviously, that this suggestion is controversial, but I
submit that if there is a real desire to curb police excesses in the
Fourth Amendment area, this might be the way to do it rather
than to penalize society by suppressing guns, narcotics and other
contraband.
Terry, when decided, was criticized widely as being too pro-
law enforcement. It has been pointed out here several times to-
day that the 1960s were a turbulent 10 years-the Kennedy as-
sassinations, the King assassination, the urban riots, and the
Vietnam protests. Although the Court is not political, it does
live in the real world. Most of the Justices live within the Belt-
way, and I suppose they watch the Washington television. Tele-
34 See generally Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, 18 U.S.C.A. ch.5, pt. A
(West 1987 & Supp. 1998).
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vision news in the District of Columbia carries a lot of crime sto-
ries. The decision that Detective McFadden and his colleagues
on the Cleveland Police Department acted properly was, in my
view, a sane and appropriate one given the state of the law in
1968. Terry itself and subsequent elaborations on Terry devel-
oped a standard that is about as clear as most Fourth Amend-
ment standards can be, and it is adequate to distinguish per-
missible from impermissible law enforcement confrontations
with suspects, at least as far as stops are concerned. In fact, the
results reached under Terry are practical, reasonable, and I
think generally defensible, so long as we have, if we're going to
have it, an exclusionary rule. They are practically as good as we
are going to get. The extension of Terry to a number of different
situations that are analogous to stops for the most part has been
logical and defensible.
Now, some of the views that I heard I'd like to comment on,
and some of the thoughts that have been expressed by others I'd
like to comment on. There is no question that what Judge Jack
Weinstein said this morning is correct. The most pervasive
problem in American society is race. There's no question about
that, and the criminal justice system and tinkering with it are
not going to solve that problem. You can tinker with criminal
justice and maybe help the overall problem, but the criminal
justice system isn't going to solve the race problem because, in-
deed, the criminal justice system has been described by some as
the cancer ward of our society.
We heard a lot about the reduction in crime. The reduction
in crime isn't because of Terry, and the increase in crime be-
tween 1966 and, let's say, 1992 wasn't because of Miranda.35
Those who say that one stopped it and the other caused it, I don't
think are being realistic. Crime is primarily a sociological phe-
nomenon. There's no question about it. Everybody knows that.
There are certain things that law enforcement can do and has
done, and hopefully will continue to do.
One recent step in the New York area, that I don't think has
ever received the degree of plaudits and congratulations that it
should, is the joint efforts by the federal officials and the state
officials to prosecute the very violent and serious street drug
3" Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that statements obtained
from defendants without instruction of constitutional rights were inadmissible as
violative of the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination).
1998] 1381
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gangs who, in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, took over
whole areas of this city. Groups like the Wild Cowboys, 36 a group
called the Velasquez Organization, the C&C Gang, the Willis
Avenue Lynch Mob37 and other violent street gangs are what I
am referring to.38  The homicide rate in precincts where those
gangs operated in the late '80s and the early '90s has been re-
duced by two thirds and three quarters because the same people
were going out and assassinating 10, 15, 20 people. Those killers
are now in prison. I just presided over a case, 20 homicides by
one gang in one case. 9 In the precincts where those crimes oc-
curred, with these people off the street the citizenry now has a
lot less to fear and a much lower crime rate. And I think that, in
that area, the police department of the city, the federal officials
and the prosecutors ought to be congratulated.
That didn't tell you an awful lot about Terry vs. Ohio, but
thank you.
3' See Scott Ladd, Cowboys Riding Shotgun in Bronx, NEWSDAY, Oct. 11, 1993,
at A06; Scott Ladd, Drug Gang 'Enforcer' Arrested, NEWSDAY, Mar. 30, 1994, at
A04..
37 See Matthew Purdy, U.S. Drives Out Bronx Drug Gang, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20,
1994. Seth Faison, Mott Haven Gangs Clash Over a Turf Called Heroin, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 23, 1994, at A5.
38 See United States v. Rodriguez, No. 94 CR. 313, 1998 WL 26189 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 26 1998) (mem.); United States v. Polanco, No. 96 CR. 0229, 1997 WL 27141
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 1997) (mem.); Francis A. McMorris, U.S. Prosecutor is Using
RICO on Gangs, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1997, at B5.
9 See United States v. Velasquez, No. S9 96 CR. 126, 1997 WL 529047 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 25, 1997).
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